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“It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside
its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest
citizens, but its lowest ones.”
Nelson Mandela
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of recent mass shootings, journalists, social
advocates, politicians, physicians and average American citizens broadly
discussed the state of mental health care in this country.1 When Ariel
Castro, the man who kept three women imprisoned in his home for
nearly a decade, committed suicide in his jail cell, people once again
discussed mental health care, though more specifically, in the prison
system.2 Lindsay Hayes, of the National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives, stated, “it was the responsibility of the mental health staff at
the prison to send him (Castro) through a battery of tests and assessments
to determine whether he was currently displaying any suicidal ideation or
behavior” and suggested that Mr. Castro had not received such
treatment.3 Mr. Castro’s situation, including his death within the
confines of his own prison cell, was not unique.

NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA
187 (1994).
1
See, e.g., Phil Tenser, 128-Page Mental Health Report About Aurora Movie
Theater Shooting Defendant James Holmes Finished, ABC NEWS (Denver) (Sept. 9,
2013), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/movie-theater-shooting/128-page-mentalhealth-report-about-theater-shooting-defendant-james-holmes-finished;
Stephanie
O’Neill, Can Better Mental Health Care Prevent Mass Killings Like The Sandy Hook
School Shootings?, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/12/19/35296/can-better-care-severely-mentally-illprevent-mass/; Jason Cherkis, Sandy Hook Mental Health: Program Gaps May Be Easier
To Fix Than Gun Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/12/19/sandy-hook-mental-health-program_n_2334017.html;
Sydney
Lupkin, Newtown Shooting Put Spotlight on U.S. Mental Health Care – Again, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/newtown-shootings-put-spotlightmental-health-care/story?id=18001556 (noting that today, the largest mental health
facilities are for inmates: Los Angeles County Jail in California, Cook County Jail in
Illinois and Rikers Island off New York City); see also Paige St. John, California Prisons
Haven’t Improved Mental Healthcare Enough, Court Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/05/local/la-me-ff-prisons-20130406.
2
Yamiche Alcindor and Donna Leinwand Leger, Disdain, Questions Surround
Suicide Of Ariel Castro, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/09/04/castro-kidnapper-suicide-jail/2768207/.
3
Id.
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Today, mental illness is endemic in prisons across this country.4 A
recent study published by Psychiatric Services, a journal of the American
Psychiatric Association, reported that prisoners are two to four times
more likely than members of the general population to develop serious
forms of mental illness.5 Additionally, the study reported that of the
20,000 inmates surveyed, 16.9 percent had a severe mental illness at the
time of data collection.6 The Bureau of Justice Statistics has estimated
that the majority of state and federal prisoners suffer from the most
serious forms of mental illness,7 including schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder and severe depression.8 Additionally, Human Rights Watch has
reported that approximately fifteen to twenty percent of inmates require
psychiatric intervention during incarceration.9 Instead of providing such
treatment, however, some prisons officials move individuals with mental
illness into solitary confinement.10 Moreover, some officials ignore
inmates, allowing them to sit in their own feces, become destructive or
engage in self-mutilation.11
4
See Jacques Baillargeon et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Repeated Incarcerations:
The Revolving Prison Door, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 103 (2009); Antonia Moras,
Human Rights Watch: The Mentally Ill in U.S. Prisons—A Review, 21 ALASKA JUSTICE F.
1, 2–4 (2004); see also Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-humanrights-and-us-prisons. “Mental illness” is described as “anxiety, depression, anger,
cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, obsessive thoughts, paranoia, and
psychosis.” Id. The lack of social interaction as well as structure within the prison
system can create mental illness or prompt a reoccurrence. Id.
5
Henry J. Steadman and Fred C. Osher, Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness
Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 6 (2009), available at http://ps.psychiatry
online.org/article.aspx?articleID=100482.
6
Id.
7
James R. P. Ogloff and Ronald Roesch, Mental Health Research in the Criminal
Justice System: the Need for Common Approaches and International Perspectives, 18
INT. J. LAW PSYCHIATRY. 1, 1–14 (1995). The term “severe mental illness” is often linked
to the acute psychopathology that some patients experience in state mental health
facilities. Id.
8
See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, supra note 4.
9
Id.
10
Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in
U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/22/solitary-confinement-and-mental-illness-us-prisons.
11
See, e.g., Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995). Young was
arrested for stealing cigarettes and sentenced to serve a ninety-day sentence. Id. at 1163.
Before being transported to the jail, Young was placed in a holding cell where she lit her
shoes and underwear on fire. Id. As a result, she damaged the holding cell and was
charged with damaging city property. Id. After serving her sentence, Young brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against jail officials, claiming that they showed deliberate
indifference towards her serious medical needs. Id.
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Consider the following case from Newark, New Jersey, where a
woman was incarcerated for setting a fatal fire.12 While in jail, prison
psychiatrists diagnosed her as suffering from schizophrenia and multiple
personality disorder.13 According to her lawyers, “she deliberately cut
her right arm and leg badly enough to require 28 stitches. Because selfmutilation violates prison rules, she was sentenced to 90 days in what is
called administrative segregation, the solitary confinement unit at
Northern State.”14 “The mere process of putting someone who’s
mentally ill in isolation for a long time will in itself cause most mentally
ill prisoners to become even sicker,” said Patricia Perlmutter, former
head of the Inmate Advocacy Law Clinic at the Seton Hall University
School of Law’s Center for Social Justice.15 “It’s like beating a dog and
leaving it in a cage and making it as violent as you can . . . ” said Dr.
Grassian, a clinical psychiatrist from Harvard University.16 “What do
you think is going to happen when you open the cage?”17
Upon opening “the cage,” one may find that the prisoner has
committed suicide. Prison officials often place the mentally ill in
compromising situations that worsen psychiatric disorders, including
one’s propensity to commit suicide.18 Consider other recent examples
from Arizona, where almost every day, one inmate attempts suicide.19
Among those who died:

12
Andy Newman, N.J. LAW; Filing Suit to Protect the Mentally Ill Who Are Behind
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/21/nyregion/nj-lawfiling-suit-to-protect-the-mentally-ill-who-are-behind-bars.html.
13
Id.
14
Id.; see also STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (2013), http://www.state.nj.us/
corrections/. Northern State is a correctional facility for male offenders located in
Newark, New Jersey. Id.
15
See Newman, supra note 12.
16
Id.
17
Id.; see also Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Louisiana Jail Locks Up Suicidal
Prisoners in 3’x3’ Cages, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (Jul. 9,
2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/07/09/louisiana-jail-locks-suicidal-prisoners-in-3-x3-cages/. The authors describe mentally ill prisoners placed in worse conditions than the
minimum standard allowable for dogs. Id.
18
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS: NAT’L STUDY OF JAIL
SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER 1, 11 (2010), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/
024308.pdf. Upon incarceration, the prisoner may experience the loss of outside relationships, victimization, further legal frustration and physical and emotional breakdowns,
among other emotions, that may cause suicide. Id. at 1.
19
Bob Ortega, Critics: ‘Maximum Security’ a Factor in Prison Suicide Rate, THE
REPUBLIC (Ariz.) (Jun. 2, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2012/06/02/
20120602arizona-prison-suicide-rate.html.
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Tony Lester was diagnosed as mentally ill.20 He bled to death
after using a razor to slash his throat, arms and groin;21
Rosario Rodriguez-Bojorquez killed himself while alone in his
cell after he was denied requests to move into another cell
because he was paranoid of other inmates;22
Karot Phothong used a bed sheet to hang himself while in
solitary confinement after he was denied the opportunity to visit
with mental health professionals.23

Today, there is robust debate regarding how to treat the mentally ill
in prison. Nation-wide, human rights advocates believe that a strong
correlation exists between mental health care in prisons and the rate of
suicide amongst inmates; as a result, they believe that prisons must adopt
medically-supported practices for dealing with the mentally ill.24
Corrections officials have generally defended their current practices,
however, explaining that the use of certain measures, like solitary
confinement, is necessary to protect the inmate and ensure prison
safety.25 The government has stated that these measures may be used as
safeguards to ensure inmate safety.26
This debate, regarding how to treat the mentally ill in prison, has
spilled over into the courts.27 Today, when a family-member or loved
one brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a correctional facility after
an inmate has committed suicide, every circuit applies the deliberate
indifference standard to adjudicate the dispute.28 Yet, each circuit has
interpreted the deliberate indifference standard differently, thus leaving
room for different levels of mental health care in prisons.29 This
20

Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Prisoners With Mental Illness Suffer-and Die-in
Arizona’s Solitary Confinement Cells, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN
LOCKDOWN (May 7, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/03/07/prisoners-with-mentalillness-suffer-and-die-in-arizonas-solitary-confinement-cells/. The authors describe the
conditions that some mentally ill prisoners face in Arizona prisons. Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Scott Shane, Obama Defends Conditions for Soldier Accused in
WikiLeaks Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/12/us/12manning.html.
27
See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
28
See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
29
See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
21
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Comment argues that the judiciary should adopt a new and more precise
legal standard to remedy the current circuit split regarding 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 jail-suicide claims; doing so will affect the type of mental health
care that prisons provide to inmates.30 Creating clear guidelines to
protect the mentally ill in the courts is a legal imperative that will yield
positive human rights reform.
First, this Comment briefly explores the historical and theoretical
antecedents to current mental health care in the prison system. Second, it
analyzes the multi-dimensional, multi-layered circuit split that exists
with respect to the interpretation and application of the deliberate
indifference in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jail-suicide claims. This section then
highlights two recent circuit court cases from the Eleventh and Third
Circuits. Third, this Comment proposes that the deliberate indifference
standard be eliminated in light of its vague meaning and unpredictable
application and that a new, more precise legal standard rooted in
international law be adopted. Finally, this Comment addresses important
countervailing considerations in resolving the circuit split and closes by
reaffirming that the United States should protect all of its citizens,
including those deemed to be its “lowest.”
II. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS: THE ROAD TO
CURRENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS
During much of the twentieth century, the United States medical
community had a limited understanding of mental illness and suicide.31
Both issues seemed to play a taboo role in public discourse,32 while the
medical community was generally more focused on AIDs and cancer
research.33 Until the latter end of the century, medical experts postured
that anyone who committed suicide necessarily had some long, pre-

30

See Eric Rosenthal and Clarence J. Sundram, The Role of Int’l Human Rights in
Nat’l Mental Health Legis., DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, 1
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 18 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy
/international_hr_in_national_mhlegislation.pdf.
31
Ellen Holtzman, A Home Away from Home, 43 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 3
(2012).
32
Mark Rice-Oxley, Critics: We Need to Keep Talking About Depression, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/08/
keep-talking-about-depression.
33
See generally Pol’y Topics, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (2012),
http://www.nami.org.
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existing mental illness.34 Today, it is understood that a multitude of
factors, including an extreme, sudden change in one’s life, extreme
psychological and sexual neglect and the removal or seclusion of oneself
from society, either by personal choice or by force,35 can give rise to
suicide.36 Significantly, these are all factors that an inmate may
experience. Thus, in the context of the prison system, a prisoner who
commits suicide may have done so on account of a pre-existing
condition, the sudden changes that he experienced as a result of being in
custody, or a combination of the two.
As the medical community published new studies on mental health
and suicide, the human rights community moved for social and legal
reform in these areas.37 For example, in 1991, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the “Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care” (the
“MI Principles”).38 While the MI Principles are non-binding in the
United States, they set a standard for dealing with the mentally ill.39 The
MI Principles protect a wide range of duties owed to the mentally ill,
such as protections against “harm, including unjustified medication,
abuse by other patients, staff or others.”40 Moreover, the MI Principles
require that medical facilities and correctional facilities monitor the
mentally ill to ensure that their human rights are being protected and that
their treatment is “based on an individually prescribed plan.”41
34
Jose Manoel Bertolote, Alexandra Fleischmann, Diego De Leo & Danuta
Wasserman, Suicide And Mental Disorders: Do We Know Enough?, BRITISH J. OF PSYCH.
(2003), http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/183/5/382.full.
35
Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED. (2012), http://www.nlm.
nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001554.htm; see also Natalie Staats Reiss & Mark
Dombeck, Suicide: Other Factors Contributing to Suicide Risk, MENTALHELP.NET,
http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=13738 (last updated Oct. 24,
2007).
36
See generally Idiko Suto, Dissertation, Inmates Who Attempted Suicide in Prison:
A Qualitative Study, PAC. U. COMMON KNOWLEDGE PROJECT (2007), http://commons.
pacificu.edu/spp/46.
37
See PAHO/WHO Collaborating Center On Public Health Law and Human Rights,
PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2012), http://www1.paho.org/English/D/
Georgetown_CCenter_MRoses.htm. See generally MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012).
38
See The Role of Int’l Human Rights in Nat’l Mental Health Legis., supra note 30,
at 12.
39
Id. at 15, 21 (noting that the standards described here can apply to psychiatric
facilities as well as non-psychiatric facilities for both mentally-ill and mentally-stable
persons).
40
Id. at 21.
41
Id.
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In 1993, members of the World Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna reaffirmed the belief that human rights law must protect people
with mental disabilities and that governments must establish legislation
to ensure protection of these rights.42 Participants of the Vienna
Convention affirmed in writing that “people with mental disabilities are
protected by the same human rights law that protects all other
individuals.”43 Human rights advocates recognized that the mentally ill
must have the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, that they must be protected against discrimination, that
they must be protected against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
and must be treated like the rest of society.44
Against this backdrop, and with the advent of more scientific
knowledge, the United States government promoted a policy shift in the
1990s to “deinstitutionalize” the mentally ill and have courts place these
individuals amongst the mainstream prison population.45 Yet, while the
medical and human rights communities have taken significant steps to
understand and protect the mentally ill over the last thirty years,46 the
United States prison47 and justice48 systems have both lagged far behind.
Placing the mentally ill in the prison system may have actually frustrated
mental health care reform.
Today, in correctional facilities across the country, the suicide rate
is approximately two and a half times higher than the national average.49
For an inmate with a serious mental illness, such as manic depression,
42

Id. at 18.
Id. at 12.
44
See supra note 30.
45
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN
CORRECTIONS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://nicic.gov/MentalIllness.
46
See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that “modern
science has rejected the notion that mental or emotional disturbances are the products of
afflicted souls, hence beyond the purview of counseling, medication and therapy”).
47
From Prisons to Hospitals and Back: The Criminalization of Mental Illness,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2012), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/menbrief.html.
48
James R. P. Ogloff, Ronald Roesch & Stephen D. Hart, Mental Health Services in
Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 119
(1994) (“Unfortunately, the Court has yet to decide a case that directly addresses the
extent to which prison and jail inmates have the right to psychological or psychiatric
assessment and treatment.”).
49
Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fe482a57.html; see also Jean
Casella & James Ridgeway, “Epidemic” of Suicides in Massachusetts Prisons, SOLITARY
WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/
08/06/masschusetts-prisons-see-epidemic-of-suicides/ (describing how suicide in prison
has become an epidemic).
43
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the anguish associated with a life behind bars may exacerbate the health
conditions he faces, lead him to act out and prompt serious
contemplation of suicide.50 Instead of providing appropriate medical
treatment, many prisons treat the mentally ill like healthy inmates and
move them into solitary confinement, removed from the general prison
population.51 Here, the inmate loses “good-time,”52 programming and
other privileges and often waits naked in his cell until his return to
general population comes due.53
After completing nation-wide studies of inmate deaths from 2000–
2009, the Bureau of Justice Statistics published a report stating that
correctional facilities have a variety of tactics at their disposal to respond
to the mentally ill beyond the use of solitary confinement; yet, in the case
of state facilities, approximately two-thirds of all prisoners with mental
health problems did not receive mental health care services after entering
prison.54 In addition, the Bureau’s report stated that the number of
inmates committing suicide while in custody is on the rise.55 Moving
correctional facilities to provide mentally ill prisoners with adequate
protection and treatment has been difficult56 and courts have not helped
the situation. Historically, courts have been reluctant to get involved in
regulating the management of prisons57 and they have not adopted clear,
uniformed standards and procedures for dealing with mentally ill
prisoners themselves.58

50

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS: PRISON SUICIDE: AN
OVERVIEW AND GUIDE TO PREVENTION 37–38 (1995), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/012
475.pdf.
51
Id. at 7.
52
“Good-time” is defined as time that will reduce the duration of the prisoner’s
sentence. A prisoner may earn “good-time” for showing positive behavior in prison.
Good Time Credit Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM (2013), http://definitions.
uslegal.com/g/good-time-credit/.
53
Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2012).
54
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., DATA COLLECTION: DEATHS
IN CUSTODY REPORTING PROGRAM (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail
&iid=243.
55
Id.
56
See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and U.S. Prisons, supra note 4.
57
Prisoner’s Rights, CORNELL U. L. SCHOOL (2012), http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/prisoners_rights.
58
See infra Part III and accompanying no/tes; see also William Babcock, Courts
Return to Hands-off Policy in Prison Rights, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jul. 31,1989),
http://articles.philly.com/1989-07-31/news/26134493_1_legitimate-penological-prisonadministrators-institutional-security.
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Today, laws meant to protect mentally ill prisoners are vague and
often inconsistently applied.59 For example, the United States Code
permits one person to bring suit against another who has subjected a
citizen of the United States to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”60 When a prisoner
has been deprived of mental health care or has committed suicide, a
petitioner may, in what is commonly referred to as a § 1983 claim, rely
on this provision in order to obtain a remedy against the jail.61 This is
the case even though the Supreme Court has yet to hear a § 1983 suit
resulting from a jail-suicide62 and has only generally acknowledged an
inmate’s right to medical care.63
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that in order to state a
cognizable § 1983 claim for depriving an inmate of his Eighth
Amendment rights, the petitioner must prove that the prison acted with
deliberate indifference towards the inmate.64 The Court acknowledged
59
60

Id.

61

See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.

See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
Daniel Goldman & Ryan Brimmer, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, SOLITARY WATCH:
NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN (2012), http://solitarywatch.com/resources/u-ssupreme-court-cases/; see Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 48, at 119 (“Unfortunately,
the Court has yet to decide a case that directly addresses the extent to which prison and
jail inmates have the right to psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment.”).
63
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–5 (1976). The Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment provides the right to medical care because failure to provide adequate
care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
64
See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. 97. In Estelle, the defendant-inmate who suffered
intense back pain sought medical attention from several prison-doctors. Id. at 99. A
physician prescribed defendant-inmate pain medication, advised him to refrain from
heavy work, suggested that he remain in his cell, and ordered him to sleep on a lower
bunk bed. Id. Prison officials refused to comply with the doctor’s orders. Id. In
December, before defendant’s pain had subsided he was ordered to perform light work.
Id. at 100. Defendant answered that he was in too much pain to work and prison officials
subsequently placed him in administrative segregation for non-compliance. Id. In midDecember, defendant saw another doctor who prescribed him medication for intense pain.
62
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that a prison’s obligation to provide adequate medical care is rooted in
“broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity
and decency”65 and that consideration of “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”66 is paramount.
When an inmate is incarcerated, the Court reasoned, he is in the hands of
the prison system and therefore, a standard must be established to
determine whether a deprivation of the inmate’s rights occurred.67 The
Court articulated a two-part test (the “Estelle test”) to determine whether
a prison deprived an inmate of proper medical care: a showing must be
made to determine whether (1) the inmate had some serious medical
need and (2) the prison showed any sign of “deliberate indifference.”68
While the Supreme Court held that prisons are constitutionally
required to provide medical care to inmates so they do not suffer
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,”69 it left the issue of proper
health care wide open, never clarifying what constitutes a “serious
medical need” worthy of care nor addressing an inmate’s right to mental
health care.70 While the need for medical care might be obvious if an
inmate is suffering from some type of physical ailment,71 the need for
mental health care is far less clear.72 An inmate’s mental health may not
Id. But the defendant did not receive his medication on time because the prison staff lost
his prescription. Id. The defendant was moved in and out of segregation through
December and January and ultimately into solitary confinement. Id. at 100–01. Days
later, the defendant was hospitalized for an irregular heart-rhythm and placed on heart
medication. Id. Shortly thereafter, the defendant asked to see another doctor, but the
prison officials refused. Id. In all, the defendant made seventeen attempts to receive
appropriate medical care for his injuries. Id. at 97.
65
Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (1968)).
66
Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
67
Id. at 102–03.
68
Id. at 104. For a more thorough discussion of both parts of the Estelle test, see
infra (explaining the serious medical need requirement and the deliberate indifference
requirement).
69
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
70
Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341 (1992); see also Ogloff,
Roesch & Hart, supra note 48, at 119.
71
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding that a serious medical need is one “so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention”).
72
Fred Cohen, Captives Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
21–22 (1993). Cohen points out the highly subjective nature of deliberate indifference,
describing that “it is actually the clinicians’ choice of the diagnostic terminology which
will move these cases from no care to discretionary care or to mandated care.” Id.; see
also Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Ship of Fools: Health Care Reform, Psychiatry
and the Uncertain Future of Normality , 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 181 (2012). Fish
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be readily apparent and, if it is, it might not be exhibited regularly and
consistently.73 Notwithstanding these differences, many circuit courts
have held that mental illness and physical illness are one and the same
and have applied the Estelle test to examine whether an inmate received
proper mental health care.74
With respect to the first prong of the Estelle test, circuit courts have
interpreted what constitutes a “serious medical need” differently.75 For
example, in Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, the First Circuit
defined serious medical need as a need that “has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention . . . the ‘seriousness’ of an inmate’s needs may also be
determined by reference to the effect of the delay of treatment.”76 Thus,
a petitioner may claim a “serious medical need” exists by showing the
existence of (1) a prior diagnosis and treatment or (2) an obvious need
for treatment.77 The Ninth Circuit, however, has defined “serious
medical need” differently, as the “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
[that] could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”78

affirms the highly subjective nature of mental illness in general, describing that the
physician is the “arbiter of what is normal and what is not” and therefore, “mental illness
is a “paradoxical reality of . . . fundamental skepticism coexisting with . . . triumphalist
reductionism.” Id. at 220.
73
Dean Keith Simonton, Are Genius and Madness Related? Contemporary Answers
to an Ancient Question, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (2005), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/
display/article/10168/52456.
74
See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1977); Greason v. Kemp, 891
F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the same general “requirements apply to physical, dental and mental
health”).
75
See, e.g., Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208. See generally McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
1050 (9th Cir. 1992). In McGuckin, the plaintiff-inmate brought a § 1983 action against
the Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that the prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Id. at 1052.
76
See Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208 (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir. 1987)).
77
Id.
78
See generally McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050. John McGuckin, an inmate in an Arizona
state correctional facility brought a § 1983 action against prison medical staff arguing that
they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Id. at 1052. McGuckin
did not receive surgery to repair a physical injury he had suffered until after he filed his
§ 1983 claim against the prison. Id. at 1061–62.
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Once a petitioner is able to prove that an inmate had a “serious
medical need,”79 he must then prove the second part of the Estelle test:
that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s needs.80 While
the first prong of the Estelle test might seem difficult to prove, the
second prong is substantially more vague and unpredictable.81 In Estelle,
the Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious illness or injury states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983”82 and can manifest in two ways: the correctional facility might
take some inappropriate affirmative action in response to the prisoner’s
needs or it might not act on the prisoner’s needs.83 The court stated that
deliberate indifference is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind” but
failed to elaborate further.84
In 1994, the Supreme Court tried to clarify the deliberate
indifference standard.85 In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual who
underwent an unsuccessful gender-reassignment surgery sued federal
prison officials claiming that they had violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.86 Farmer was assigned a cell amongst the general prison
population and was raped and beaten by another inmate.87 The Court in
Farmer spelled out what a prisoner must prove in order to bring suit
against a correctional facility.88 The Court ruled that a successful
deliberate indifference claim requires a finding that the prison was
subjectively aware of the inmate’s condition.89 In other words, in order
to prove deliberate indifference, the petitioner must show that that the
jailer knew of the prisoner’s serious medical need and effectively did
nothing about it.90 It also limited the scope of deliberate indifference by
defining what constitutes a serious medical need.91 Yet, the Supreme
79

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Id.
81
See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
82
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
83
Id. at 106.
84
Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947)).
85
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
86
Id. at 831.
87
Id. at 830.
88
Id. at 841–46 (“Whether an official has knowledge of a particular need, however,
is a question of fact that can be resolved in favor of the inmate if the trier of fact could
conclude that the official must have known of the need from the very fact that it was so
obvious.”).
89
Id. at 845.
90
Id. at 829, 845–46.
91
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. The Court stated that a serious medical need is a “risk of
serious damage to his future health.” Id.
80
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Court in Farmer did not clarify how this standard would apply in cases
where a prisoner is claiming a denial of adequate mental health care or
where a petitioner is bringing a § 1983 jail-suicide action.92
Justice Stevens recognized that the deliberate indifference standard
still lacks clarity.93 He argued that the majority in Estelle gave the
prison system too much authority to determine whether the inmate had a
serious medical need and made it too easy for the prison to refute a claim
of deliberate indifference.94 While a petitioner might be able to prove the
existence of a serious medical need, especially if an inmate’s mental
illness predated his incarceration, proving that a jail acted with deliberate
indifference is complicated, if not nearly impossible.95
III. APPLICATION OF THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN
§ 1983 JAIL-SUICIDE CLAIMS
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts
have interpreted and applied the deliberate indifference standard in a
variety of ways in adjudicating § 1983 claims related to mental health
care in prisons.96 A look at the plain meaning of the words “deliberate”
and “indifference” allows for various and conflicting interpretations of
the standard.97 Circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted deliberate
indifference to mean either knowledge and a failure to act,98 an
inexcusable lack of due care,99 criminal recklessness,100 tortuous

92

Id. at 829, 845.
Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s ‘Cruel and
Unusual Punishment’ Clause as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317,
332–33 (2003) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976)) (noting that Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority’s decision to use the deliberate indifference standard,
noting its highly subjective nature). In Estelle, Justice Stevens stated: “it is impossible to
assess the quality of the medical attention [prisoner] received.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 110.
94
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Boyer, supra note 93, at
332–33.
95
BOYER, supra note 93, at 332–33.
96
See discussion infra.
97
See generally Russel W. Gray, Comment, Wilson v. Seiter; Defining the
Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992).
98
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (establishing that prisons have
a duty of care towards inmates). The Supreme Court ruled that a prison’s failure to
provide inmate with treatment and take reasonable steps to protect the inmate constituted
deliberate indifference. Id. at 311. The Court found deliberate indifference despite there
being no clear Constitutional authority on point. Id. at 330.
99
Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
93
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recklessness,101 callousness102 or allowing systemic gross deficiencies.103
In Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections,104 the Seventh Circuit
articulated its own interpretation of “deliberate indifference” by stating:
If [the prison] place[s] a prisoner in a cell that has a cobra, but
they do not know that there is a cobra there (or even that there is
a high probability that there is a cobra there), they are not guilty
of deliberate indifference even if they should have known about
the risk, that is, even if they were negligent—even grossly
negligent or even reckless in the tort sense—in failing to know.
But if they know that there is a cobra there or at least that there is
a high probability of a cobra there, and do nothing, that is
deliberate indifference.105

The circuit courts are extremely divided in their interpretation and
application of the deliberate indifference standard when adjudicating 42
U.S.C. § 1983 jail-suicide actions.106 This fissure is readily apparent
when examining two cases, one from the Eleventh Circuit and the other
from the Third Circuit.107
A. Hazleton v. DeKalb County – Eleventh Circuit
In Hazleton v. DeKalb County, Joshua Hazleton, a 19-year-old
pretrial detainee, committed suicide in a Georgia jail.108 Hazleton first
arrived at the DeKalb County jail on January 24, 2006 to await his trial
after being charged with murder.109 The inmate went through an initial
100
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that “gross
negligence” is not enough to find deliberate indifference; rather, criminal negligence is
the correct standard).
101
See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a prison acts
with deliberate indifference if it recklessly disregarded an inmate’s right to be free from
risk of harm); Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that reckless
disregard is the measurable standard constituting deliberate indifference); Berry v. City of
Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495–96 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that deliberate indifference
occurs when a prison’s policy “disregards a known or obvious risk”).
102
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that deliberate indifference is akin
to “callous indifference to federally-protected rights”).
103
See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505–06 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
prison may act with deliberate indifference towards the inmate if shows systemic and
gross deficiencies or a pattern of negligence).
104
Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 1995).
105
Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
106
See infra discussion accompanying footnotes 108-55.
107
See infra discussion accompanying footnotes 108-55.
108
Hazelton v. DeKalb Cnty., 496 F. App’x 931 (11th Cir. 2012).
109
Id. at 932.
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medical screening and was assigned to the general population.110 One
month later, in February 2006, the jail’s mental health staff evaluated
Hazelton for the first time; he went through ten subsequent, independent
evaluations until his death in January 2007.111 In June 2006, Hazleton
was diagnosed with “psychiatric disorder” by a jail psychiatrist and was
prescribed anti-psychotic medication.112 In October, jail officials placed
Hazleton on suicide watch after he stated that he wanted to hurt
himself.113 That same month, a DeKalb County Superior Court judge
declared Hazleton incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be
transferred to a hospital facility.114 Hazleton never made it to that
hospital. On January 9, 2007, he committed suicide.115 None of the
officers on watch that night had any information regarding Hazleton’s
mental state or previous medical history.116 Shortly after his death,
Hazleton’s mother filed a § 1983 action against the officers, the county
and other individuals, alleging that all defendants were deliberately
indifferent to her son’s mental health care needs.117
In Hazleton, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that to prevail on a § 1983
jail-suicide action, the plaintiff must show that defendants “displayed
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.”118 The
court stated that a showing of “deliberate indifference requires that the
defendant deliberately disregard[ed] a strong likelihood rather than a
mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.”119 In this
case, Hazleton was placed in general population, despite stating his
intention to commit suicide.120 On the night that Hazleton committed
suicide, he sounded an emergency button several times, according to
written statements by other inmates on the cell block, and no one
responded to his call.121 Notwithstanding these facts, the court ruled that
the plaintiffs did not meet their evidentiary burden and affirmed the
district court’s ruling in favor of the prison officials.122 According to the
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 932.
Id.
Id. at 933.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id. at 934.
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Eleventh Circuit, stating an intention to commit suicide and sounding the
alarm button several times did not constitute a strong likelihood that the
self-infliction of harm would occur.123
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling was significant in that it shaped the
deliberate indifference standard based on probability and not on any rigid
framework.124 The court did not elaborate on what a “strong likelihood”
means; it did not provide any metric system to quantify a “strong
likelihood” and it did not explain how to distinguish between a “strong
likelihood” versus a “mere possibility.”125 In addition, the court
articulated a definition of deliberate indifference that only considered
bodily harm, not mental illness.126 A petitioner must prove that jail
officials disregarded a strong likelihood that a prisoner would self-inflict
physical harm as opposed to suffer some psychiatric consequence.127
The court’s definition did not create a rigid link between the jail’s actions
and the inmate’s actions.128 It only contemplated whether a strong
chance existed that the prisoner would hurt himself.129
Curiously, the court held that a “strong likelihood” of harm did not
exist in the Hazleton case despite facts in the record that might suggest
otherwise.130 This begs the question: who should be the judge of whether
“strong likelihood” of harm exists in such matters and based on what
evidence should such a determination be made?131 Should a medical
professional have to declare whether a strong likelihood exists that a
prisoner will commit harm to himself? Should the prison facility make
the determination itself? The Eleventh Circuit has equivocated on this
issue132 and, in doing so, has interpreted “deliberate indifference” in a

123

Id.
Id. at 933.
125
Id.
126
Hazleton, 496 F. App’x at 933.
127
Id.
128
Note, for instance, that the court did not say, “If jailer acted in X way and prisoner
reacted in Y way, then deliberate indifference shall be found to have existed.” Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See, e.g., Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 21 F.3d 388, 393–94 (1994) (“[D]eliberate
indifference could be inferred from an unexplained delay in treating a known or obvious
serious medical condition” and “the contours of the legal norms on deliberate
indifference to medical needs have been subsequently evolving.”); see also City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that deliberate indifference stems
from a showing of whether or not prison officials were adequately trained).
124
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B. Baez v. Lancaster County – Third Circuit
In Baez v. Lancaster County, Marva Baez brought a § 1983 action
against the Lancaster County Prison, alleging that the jailer acted with
deliberate indifference towards her brother, Luis Villafane, an inmate
who committed suicide.134 Mr. Villafane was in the Lancaster County
Prison after being arrested for rape, aggravated assault and other serious
crimes.135 After being committed to the Lancaster County Prison, Mr.
Villafane met with a nurse who asked him a series of questions about his
medical and mental history.136 Mr. Villafane told the nurse that he had
recently lost his mother and that he had nothing to look forward to and,
as a result, he was placed on a suicide watch.137 Mr. Villafane also met
with a psychologist who provided medical services for the Lancaster
County Prison.138 The doctor spoke to Mr. Villafane and took him off of
suicide-watch, but noted, “inmates who are taken off suicide status might
still be suicidal.”139 After a confrontation with prison guards, Mr.
Villafane asked to be placed in a suicide-prevention cell because he was
“stressing.”140 Prison officials honored his request and gave him a smock
to wear.141 Three days later, prison officials downgraded Mr. Villafane’s
suicide status and four days after that, they downgraded him even further
to general observation.142 Approximately ten days later, Mr. Villafane
was transferred to a regular cell.143 During the transfer, a fellow inmate
testified that he heard Mr. Villafane say he was going to kill himself.144
On November 18, 2008, Mr. Villafane ripped his bed sheets and hung
himself inside his prison cell.145

133

See, e.g., infra discussion accompanying notes 137–58.
Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012).
135
Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., CIV.A. 09-2745, 2011 WL 4948891, at *1(E.D. Pa. Oct.
18, 2011), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Baez, 2011 WL 4948891, at *3.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at *4.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit examined how jailers treated Mr.
Villafane and applied its own unique formulation of the deliberate
indifference standard.146 Specifically, the court examined whether “(1)
the detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide,’ (2) the custodial
officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and
(3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference’ to the detainee’s
particular vulnerability.”147 The court found that deliberate indifference
calls for both objective and subjective scrutiny, and found that the
officers did not know and should not have known, based on the evidence,
of the inmate’s particular vulnerability to suicide.148 Specifically, the
court relied heavily on the third prong of the test and found that the
jailers did not act recklessly when dealing with Mr. Villafane.149 In using
the term “reckless indifference,” the court created a high threshold to
prove deliberate indifference, one akin to criminal liability.150 In fact, the
court stated that proving deliberate indifference requires “a level of
culpability higher than a negligent failure to protect from self-inflicted
harm.”151
Since the Supreme Court has yet to provide any guidance on how
the deliberate indifference standard should apply to cases dealing with
mental health care in prisons, circuit courts have inconsistently applied
the standard in such disputes.152 Within only a few weeks of each other,
two circuit courts split on what the deliberate indifference standard
means in the context of § 1983 jail-suicide claims.153 Whereas in the
Eleventh Circuit, a petitioner must rely heavily on speculation that a
“strong likelihood” of self-harm will occur in order to prevail in his

146

See generally Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., 487 F. App’x 30 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 31.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 32.
150
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2012). The Model Penal Code adopts recklessly as
standard of criminal culpability, described as:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
Id. (emphasis added).
151
Baez, 487 F. App’x at 31.
152
See supra discussion accompanying notes 96–107.
153
See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–51.
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claim, in the Third Circuit, a petitioner must rely on reckless
indifference, a well-developed tort and criminal-based standard.154
This is problematic because if an inmate commits suicide while in
custody, a petitioner’s ability to prevail against a jail will vary
significantly depending on where the suit is brought. For example, in the
Third Circuit, it seems unlikely that a petitioner could prove that the
jailer acted with reckless indifference or that the jailer grossly deviated
from a more typical standard of care in the moments leading up to the
prisoner’s death. This has created a multitude of outcomes—a variation
in the type of mental health care provided by prisons—among cases that
are factually quite similar.155
This split allows prisons across the
country to offer different degrees of mental health care to inmates
depending on which circuit the prison is located within.
IV. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A GUIDE TO REFORM MENTAL
HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS AND RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
As scientific advances and public interest in mental health issues
grow, international law dealing with mental health issues has developed.
Looking to international law may provide important guidance in creating
legal clarity amongst the circuit courts and may help to create a
uniformed standard of mental health care in prisons across the country.156
According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.”157 The United States should look to the ICCPR, as well as other
international legal mechanisms, for guidance as they provide an
alternative to the country’s failed policies and promote the dignity of all
human beings.158 In fact, applying international human rights laws to
solve domestic challenges is not a novel idea.159 Various public law
groups, individual attorneys and even Supreme Court justices have all
advocated for applying international law to solve national issues.160
154

See supra discussion accompanying notes 108–51.
See generally Part III and accompanying notes.
156
See discussion infra.
157
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
158
Alvin Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, Using International Human Rights Laws
and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811, 814 (2004).
159
Id. at 815.
160
Id. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155
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While not self-executing, international law such as treaties can trump
state law and provide solid guidance on how to deal with prison
conditions.161 Domestic courts have cited the United Nations Standard
for the Minimum Treatment of Prisoners,162 for example, even though it
is not binding.163
In addition, international human rights mechanisms like the
American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (“IACPPT”) lay out clear
prohibitions against inhumane treatment towards prisoners.164 For
example, Article Six of the IACPPT states that governments shall “take
effective measures to prevent and punish other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment within their jurisdiction.”165 In other
words, the United States should not just take any measure to prevent
inhuman treatment towards prisoners. Rather, the government should
take effective measures to ensure that prisoners are being treated with
dignity and receiving an appropriate standard of care.166
Taking the IACPPT and other international mechanisms into
consideration, the United States should first create some new protocol for
prisons to meet basic human rights obligations towards the mentally ill
and reduce the number of jail-suicides amongst inmates. The MI
principles, promulgated in 1991 by the United Nations General
Assembly, also provide an important framework for reform, outlining
161

See Bronstein & Gainsborough, supra note 158 at 817.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,, E.S.C. Res. 633C
(XXJV) U.N. ESCOR, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611 (1950), U.N. ESCOR, Supp.
No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, (LXII), U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
163
See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 622 (1981); Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F.
Supp. 869, 874 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 1996).
164
The American Convention on Human Rights is available at http:// www.oas.org/
juridico/English/treaties/b-32.html. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture is available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/ENGLISH/Treaties/a51.html.
165
See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 164.
Article 7 states:
The States Parties shall take measures so that, in the training of police
officers and other public officials responsible for the custody of persons
temporarily or definitively deprived of their freedom, special emphasis shall
be put on the prohibition of the use of torture in interrogation, detention, or
arrest.
Id.
166
Id. The convention incorporates four primary goals; the prevention, investigation,
sanction and reparation of human rights violations.
162
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that the mentally ill have: (1) a right to individualized treatment; (2) a
right to rehabilitation and treatment that enhances autonomy; (3) a right
to independence and social integration; (4) a right to least restrictive
services and (5) a right to community-based services, amongst others.167
This framework is clear and, were the United States to apply it, those
with mental illness in custody would likely receive greater protection
than they do now.
In addition to reforming the current prison system through on-theground measures, the United States should revise its current legal
framework with respect to adjudicating jail-suicide claims, as it has
negatively impacted mental health care in prisons. The deliberate
indifference standard, currently used by courts, is confusing and has
caused a split amongst the circuit courts.168 It has created a system where
prisons across the country are held to different variations of the legal
standard and those challenging the prison have an unclear, inconsistent
chance at obtaining a remedy.169 In order to create predictability
amongst the circuits and uniformly and positively impact mental health
care in prisons, the judiciary should adopt a clearer standard to adjudicate
§ 1983 jail-suicide claims: one of due diligence.
The due diligence standard has long been a part of international
jurisprudence and references to the standard can be found in declarations
from the ancient Roman Empire.170 Under this standard, a state is
required to prevent, investigate, punish and provide remedies for human
rights violations.171 In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
revisited the due diligence standard in the landmark case Velásquez
Rodríguez v. Honduras, which concerned the disappearance of Manfredo
Velásquez.172 The court held that “[a]n illegal act which violates human
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for
example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person
responsible has not been identified) can lead to international
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the
167

Id.
See supra discussion Part III.
169
See supra discussion Part III.
170
See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of
Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265,
278 (2004).
171
Yakin Ertürk, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (2006).
172
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, (Ser. C) No. 4, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (1988), http://www.refworld.org/docid/40279a9e4.html.
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lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as
required by the Convention.”173 The Velásquez case defined the due
diligence standard as a mechanism to prevent attacks on a person’s life,
physical integrity or liberty from degrading and negligible practices.174
In recent years, due diligence has been invoked, though sparingly, to help
drive prison reform and prevent these sort of attacks on inmates.175
Whereas under the deliberate indifference standard, a prison may
easily be able to escape liability, a standard of due diligence is more
difficult to overcome, requiring something extra and more specific on the
part of the prison.176 This is an affirmative defense: the jail can escape
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a high
managerial agent—a prison official—acted with “due diligence” to
prevent an offense from occurring.177 In the context of § 1983 jailsuicide claims, a due diligence standard would require a prison to show
all of the affirmative steps it took to prevent an inmate from committing
suicide, which would likely entail some measure of mental health care.
V. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
Several obstacles exist in adopting and applying international legal
and human rights standards to reform domestic laws and practices. For
centuries, the United States has generally viewed international human
rights laws, standards and norms as a tool to put other less
compassionate, less welcoming nations on notice of democratic values.178
This nation has believed that its own Constitution, supplemented by
strong laws, guarantees far more rights than those conferred by
international human rights laws.179
In addition, the United States justice system has generally
considered the prison system to be a “dark world” and as such, courts are
apt to take a “hands off approach” to prison reform.180 In fact, this
173

Id. at ¶172.
Id. at ¶ 166.
175
See Marni von Wilpert, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner’s Last Chance, Attorney
Error, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s One-Year Statute of
Limitations Period for Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1431
(2010).
176
Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 519 (1st Cir. 1978) (explaining that
due diligence requires something more than just passive waiting).
177
III. Standards of Liability, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1243, 1257–58 (1979).
178
See generally Bronstein and Gainsborough, supra note 158.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 812.
174

196

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:173

country’s bout with frivolous lawsuits served to undermine prison
litigation, often allowing harsh prison conditions to go unnoticed and
even dismissed in the most conservative courts.181 Such a climate
prompted the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997(e), for example, which has limited inmates’ access to the courts
and has restricted the judiciary’s ability to reform harsh prison
conditions.182 However, one look at the prison system – and over thirty
years of litigation challenging the system – makes plain that the
Constitution and domestic practices are simply failing to protect
prisoners.183
Furthermore, opponents may raise concerns regarding the
public/private dichotomy in international human rights law and domestic
law, both of which were founded upon a minimalist conception of the
State.184
International law, like domestic law, has often held the
“private” sphere to be off limits to State intervention.185 Adopting a
stringent, uniform, due diligence standard to adjudicate § 1983 jailsuicide claims and enacting necessary reforms might be difficult,
considering the increasingly vast number of private for-profit prisons in
this country.186 Private prisons have eroded the government’s federal
prison policies, wielding extreme influence over legislators and criminal
justice policies in order to create a market for their products.187 These
for-profit entities have championed pro-incarceration policies and have
challenged prison reform through vigorous judicial appeal, lobbying and
political advocacy.188 Private prisons would likely challenge the
adoption of any standard that places greater restrictions on the prison
system as a whole. However, creating a uniform system of mental health
care in prisons and adopting a more precise legal definition to adjudicate
181
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§ 1983 jail-suicide claims based on international standards would likely
have a positive effect on these prisons by creating a more rigid
operational framework and greater predictability in mental health care
and suicide-related proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States must address mental health care in prisons.
Today, there is no standard protocol for providing adequate mental
health care to individuals behind bars and notably, jail-suicides are
increasing.189 Moreover, the justice system has adopted an imprecise
standard for adjudicating § 1983 jail-suicide claims, creating a circuit
split amongst the courts and more uncertainty in jailhouse practices.190
Adoption of a precise due diligence standard would reform jail practices
and avert human rights violations by placing greater emphasis on
affirmative practices, which the current deliberate indifference standard
fails to achieve.191 This would help ensure that mentally ill prisoners are
receiving adequate mental health care prior to reentry and enable the
United States to protect all its citizens, from top to bottom.

189
190
191

See supra discussion Parts I, II.
See supra discussion Parts I, II.
See supra discussion Part IV.

